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Abstract
Measurement of information flow requires a definition of
leakage, which traditionally has been defined to occur when
an attacker’s uncertainty about secret data is reduced. We
show that this uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for
measuring information flow when an attacker is making as-
sumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might
be incorrect. Moreover, we show that such attacker beliefs
are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of
leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs,
we develop a model that describes how an attacker’s belief
changes due to the attacker’s observation of the execution of
a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads
to a new metric for quantitative information flow that mea-
sures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.
1. Introduction
Qualitative security properties, such as noninterference
[9], are inappropriate for some programs, because such
properties typically either prohibit any flow of information
from a high security level to a lower level, or they allow any
amount of flow so long as it passes through some release
mechanism. For a program whose correct functioning re-
quires flow from high to low, the former approach is too re-
strictive and the latter can lead to unbounded leakage of in-
formation. Quantitative flow properties, such as “at most k
bits leak per run of the program”, allow violating flows but
with restricted rates. Such properties characterize the secu-
rity of programs whose nature require that some—but not
too much—information be leaked. The prime examples of
such programs are guards that sit at the boundary between
trusted and untrusted systems, such as password checkers.
Defining the quantity of information flow is more diffi-
cult than it might seem. Consider a password checker PWC
that sets an authentication flag a by checking a stored pass-
word p against a (guessed) password g supplied by the user.
PWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0
For simplicity, suppose that the password is either A, B,
or C. Suppose also that the user is actually an attacker at-
tempting to discover the password, and he believes the pass-
word is overwhelmingly likely to be A but has a minuscule
and equally likely chance to be either B or C. (This need
not be an arbitrary assumption on the attacker’s part; per-
haps the attacker was told by a usually reliable informant
that the password is A.) If the attacker experiments by run-
ning the program and guessing A, he expects the outcome
to be that a is equal to 1. Such a confirmation of the at-
tacker’s suspicion does seem to convey some small amount
of information. But suppose that the informant was wrong:
the real password is C. The outcome of this experiment has
a equal to 0, from which the attacker infers that A is not
the password. Common sense dictates that his new belief is
that B and C each have a 50% chance of being the pass-
word. The attacker’s belief is greatly changed—he is sur-
prised to discover the password is not A—so this outcome
seems to convey a larger amount of information than the
previous outcome. Thus, the information conveyed by run-
ning PWC depends on what the attacker believes.
How much information flows from p to a in each of the
above experiments? Answers to this question traditionally
have been based on change in uncertainty [5, 19, 10, 1, 15,
2, 16]: information flow is measured by the reduction in
the attacker’s uncertainty about secret data. Observe that,
in the case where the password was C, the attacker initially
is quite certain (though wrong) about the value of the pass-
word and after the experiment is rather uncertain about the
value of the password; the change from “quite certain” to
“rather uncertain” is an increase in uncertainty. So accord-
ing to the reduction in uncertainty metric, no information
flow occurred, which flatly contradicts our intuition. The
problem with reduction in uncertainty as a metric is that it
does not take accuracy into account. Accuracy and uncer-
tainty are orthogonal properties of the attacker’s belief—
being certain does not make one correct—and as the pass-
word checking example illustrates, the amount of informa-
tion flow depends on accuracy rather than on uncertainty.
This paper presents a new way of measuring information
flow, based on this insight. Section 2 gives the basic repre-
sentations and notations for beliefs and programs. Section
3 describes a model that is a precise characterization of the
interaction between attackers and systems; it also describes
how attackers update their beliefs from observing execution
of programs. Section 4 defines a new quantitative flow met-
ric, based on information theory, that successfully captures
the amount of information flow due to changes in the accu-
racy of an attacker’s belief. The model and metric are for-
mulated for use with any programming language that can
be given a denotational semantics that is compatible with
the representation of beliefs, and Section 5 instantiates the
model and metric for a particular programming language
(while-programs plus probabilistic choice). Section 6 dis-
cusses related work, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Incorporating Beliefs
Our measure of information flow is based on accuracy
of beliefs. A belief is a statement an agent makes about the
state of the world, accompanied by some measure of how
certain the agent is about the truthfulness of the statement.
We begin by developing some mathematical structures for
representing beliefs.
2.1. Distributions
A frequency distribution is a function δ that maps a pro-
gram state to a frequency, where a frequency is a non-
negative real number. A frequency distribution is essen-
tially an unnormalized probability distribution over pro-
gram states; frequency distributions are known to serve bet-
ter than probability distributions as the basis for a program-
ming language semantics [20]. Henceforth, we write “dis-
tribution” to mean “frequency distribution”.
The set of all program states is State, and the set of all
distributions is Dist. The structure of State is unimportant;
it can be instantiated according to the needs of any partic-
ular language or system. For our examples, states are maps
from variables to values, where domains Var and Val are
both countable sets.
v ∈ Var
σ ∈ State , Var → Val
δ ∈ Dist , State → R+
The mass in a distribution δ is the sum of all the frequen-
cies:
mass(δ) ,
∑
σ δ(σ)
A probability distribution has mass 1, but a frequency distri-
bution may have any non-negative mass. A point mass is a
distribution that maps a single state to 1, and all other states
to 0. It is denoted by placing a dot over the state:
σ˙ , λσ′ . if σ′ = σ then 1 else 0
2.2. Semantic Functions
Execution of program S is described by a denotational
semantics in which the meaning of S is written [[S]], and is
a function of type State → Dist. We also require that this
semantics can be lifted to a function of type Dist → Dist by
the following definition:
[[S]]δ , λσ .
∑
σ′ δ(σ
′) · ([[S]]σ′)(σ)
This is a healthiness condition that requires the mean-
ing of programs as distribution transformers to be deter-
mined by the meaning of programs as state transformers. By
defining programs in terms of how they operate on distribu-
tions we permit analysis of probabilistic programs. Section
5 shows how to build a semantics of this form.
2.3. Labels and Projections
We need a way to identify secret data; confidentiality
labels satisfy this need. For simplicity, we assume there
are only two such labels: a label L that indicates low-
confidentiality (public) data, and a label H that indicates
high-confidentiality (secret) data. Assume that State is a
product of two domains StateL and StateH , which con-
tain the low- and high-labeled data, respectively. A low
state is an element σL ∈ StateL; a high state is an ele-
ment σH ∈ StateH . The projection of state σ ∈ State onto
StateL is written σ  L; this is the part of σ that is vis-
ible to the attacker. Projection onto StateH , the part of σ
that is not visible to the attacker, is written σ  H .
Assume that each variable in a program is labeled to in-
dicate the confidentiality of the information in that variable;
for example, xL is a variable x that contains low informa-
tion. For convenience, assume that variable l is labeled L
and variable h is labeled H . Let VarL be the set of variables
in a program that are labeled L; then StateL = VarL →
Val. The low projection σ  L of a state σ is:
σ  L , λv ∈ VarL . σ(v)
States σ and σ′ are low-equivalent, written σ ≈L σ′, if
they have the same low projection:
σ ≈L σ
′ , (σ  L) = (σ′  L)
Distributions also have projections. Let δ be a distribu-
tion and σL a low state. Then (δ  L)(σL) is the frequency
with which any state whose low projection is σL occurs in
δ:1
δ  L , λσL ∈ StateL .
∑
σ′ | (σ′L) = σL
δ(σ′)
1 Formula ?x∈D | R P is a quantification in which ? is the quantifier
(such as ∀ or Σ), x is the variable that is bound in R and P , D is the
domain of x, R is the range, and P is the body. We omit D, R, and
even x when they are clear from context; an omitted range means R =
true.
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High projections and high equivalence are defined by
replacing each occurrence of L with H in the definitions
above.
2.4. Belief Representation
To reason about beliefs, we must choose a representation
for them. Many representations, both quantitative and qual-
itative, have been developed; Halpern [12] presents several
representations that all share the idea of possible worlds, the
set W of all elementary outcomes about which beliefs can
be held. Though we do fix a belief representation, the re-
sults presented below are mostly independent of any partic-
ular representation.
To be usable in our framework, a representation must
have certain natural operations defined. Let b and b′ be be-
liefs about possible worlds W and W ′, respectively.
1. Belief product ⊗ combines b and b′ into a new belief
b ⊗ b′ about possible worlds W ×W ′, where W and
W ′ must be disjoint.
2. Belief update b|U is the belief that results when b is
updated to include the new information that the actual
world is in a set U ⊆W of possible worlds.
3. Belief distance D(b _ b′) is a real number r ≥ 0 that
quantifies the difference between b and b′.
The rest of this paper uses distributions to represent be-
liefs. We take high states as the possible worlds for beliefs,
fixing W to be StateH . We define a belief b as a normalized
distribution over high states, i.e. mass(b) = 1. Whereas
distributions correspond to positive measures, beliefs cor-
respond to probability measures. Probability measures are
well-studied as a belief representation [12], and have sev-
eral advantages here: they are familiar, quantitative, satisfy
the required operations, and admit a programming language
semantics (as shown in Section 5). There is also a nice jus-
tification for the numbers they produce: roughly, b(σ) char-
acterizes the amount of money an attacker should be willing
to bet that σ is the true state of the system [12].
For belief product ⊗, we define a more general distri-
bution product ⊗ of two distributions δ1 : A → R+ and
δ2 : B → R
+
, where A and B are disjoint, as:
δ1 ⊗ δ2 , λ(σ1, σ2) ∈ A×B . δ1(σ1) · δ2(σ2)
It is easy to check that if b and b′ are beliefs, then b ⊗ b′ is
too. For belief update |, we use distribution conditioning:
δ|U , λσ . if σ ∈ U then δ(σ)∑
σ′∈U δ(σ
′)
else 0
For belief distance D we use relative entropy, an
information-theoretic metric [13] for the distance be-
tween distributions.
D(b′ _ b) ,
∑
σ b(σ) · log
b(σ)
b′(σ)
The base of the logarithm in D can be chosen arbitrarily; we
use base two and write lg to indicate log2, making bits the
unit of measurement for distance. The relative entropy of b
to b′ is the expected inefficiency (that is, the number of addi-
tional bits that must be sent) of an optimal code that is con-
structed by assuming an inaccurate distribution over sym-
bols b′ when the real distribution is b [13]. Like an analytic
metric, D(b′ _ b) is always at least zero and D(b′ _ b)
equals zero only when b = b′.2
Relative entropy has the property that if b(σ) > 0 and
b′(σ) = 0, then D(b′ _ b) = ∞. An infinite distance be-
tween beliefs would cause difficulty in measuring change
in accuracy. To avoid this anomaly, beliefs may be required
to satisfy certain restrictions. For example, an attacker’s be-
lief b might be restricted such that:
(min σH b(σH)) ≥

|State  H|
for some  > 0, which ensures that b is never off by
more than a factor of  from a uniform distribution; we
call such beliefs admissible. Other admissibility restrictions
may be substituted for this one if the analysis context sug-
gests stronger assumptions about how attackers form their
beliefs.
3. Experiments
We formalize as an experiment how an attacker, an agent
that reasons about beliefs, revises his beliefs from interac-
tion with a system, an agent that executes programs. The
attacker should not learn about the high input to the pro-
gram but is allowed to observe (and perhaps influence) low
inputs and outputs. Other agents (a system operator, other
users of the system with their own high data, an informant
upon which the attacker relies, etc.) might be involved when
an attacker interacts with a system; however, it suffices to
condense all of these to just the attacker and the system, be-
cause the system can act for any other agents.
In a particular experiment, we are chiefly interested in
the program S with which the attacker is interacting. We
conservatively assume that the attacker knows the source
code of S. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that S
always terminates and that it never modifies the high state.
Section 3.4 discusses how both restrictions can be lifted
without significant changes.
2 Unlike an analytic metric, D does not satisfy the triangle inequality.
However, there is no compelling reason to assume that the triangle in-
equality holds for beliefs: perhaps it is easier to rule out a possibility
from a belief than to add a new one, or vice-versa.
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An experiment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉 is conducted as fol-
lows.
1. The attacker chooses a prebelief bH about the high
state.
2. (a) The system picks a high state σH
(b) The attacker picks a low state σL.
3. The system executes the program S, which produces a
state σ′ ∈ Γ(δ′) as output, where δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H).
The attacker observes the low projection of the output
state: o = σ′  L.
4. The attacker infers a postbelief: b′H = (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗
bH)|o))  H ∈ B(E)
Figure 1. Experiment Protocol
3.1. Experiment Protocol
Formally, an experiment E is a tuple:
E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉
where S is the program, bH is the attacker’s belief, σH is the
high projection of the initial state, and σL is the low projec-
tion of the initial state. The protocol for experiments is sum-
marized in Figure 1. Here is a justification for the protocol.
An attacker’s prebelief, describing his belief at the be-
ginning of the experiment, may be chosen arbitrarily (sub-
ject to the admissibility requirement in Section 2.4) or may
be informed by previous experiments. In a series of experi-
ments, the postbelief from one experiment becomes the pre-
belief to the next. The attacker might even choose a prebe-
lief bH that contradicts his true subjective probability dis-
tribution on the state, and this gives our analysis additional
power, because it allows the attacker to conduct experiments
that answer questions such as “What would happen if I were
to believe bH?”.
The system chooses σH , the high projection of the ini-
tial state, and it might remain constant from one experiment
to the next or it might vary. For example, Unix passwords
do not usually change frequently, but the PINs on RSA Se-
curID tokens change each minute. We conservatively as-
sume that the attacker chooses all of σL, the low projection
of the initial state, since this gives him additional power in
controlling execution of the program.3 The attacker’s choice
of σL is likely to be influenced by bH , but for generality, we
do not require there be such a strategy.
Program S is executed only a single time in a single ex-
periment; multiple executions are modeled by multiple ex-
3 More generally, both the system and the attacker might contribute to
σL. But since we are concerned with only confidentiality, not integrity,
of information, we do not need to distinguish which parts are chosen
by which agent.
periments. The meaning of S given input σ˙L⊗σ˙H is an out-
put distribution δ′:
δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
From δ′ the attacker makes an observation, which is a
low projection of an output state. Probabilistic programs
may yield many possible output states, but in a single execu-
tion of the program, only one output state can be produced.
So in a single experiment, the attacker is allowed only a
single observation. A single state is chosen from a distrib-
ution by sampling operator Γ, where Γ(δ) generates a state
σ from the domain of δ with probability δ(σ)/mass(δ);
the mass operator is used to normalize the distribution to
a probability distribution. To emphasize the fact that the
choice is made randomly, assignment of a sample is writ-
ten σ ∈ Γ(δ), using ∈ instead of =. The observation o re-
sulting from δ′ is:
o ∈ Γ(δ′)  L
The formula the attacker uses for postbelief b′H in Fig-
ure 1 has the attacker perform two operations. The first op-
eration is to use the semantics of S along with prebelief
bH as the distribution on high input. This “thought experi-
ment” generates the inferences the attacker can make from
his knowledge of the program text and low inputs by pre-
dicting the output distribution. We define the prediction δ′A
to correlate the output state with the high input state:
δ′A = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)
The second operation is to condition prediction δ′A on
observation o. This incorporates any additional inferences
that can be made from the observation, then restricts that to
high inputs:
b′H = (δ
′
A|o)  H
The conditioning operator | is a specialization of distribu-
tion conditioning. It removes all the mass in distribution δ
that is inconsistent with observation o, then normalizes the
distribution:
δ|o , λσ . if (σ  L) = o then δ(σ)
(δ  L)(o)
else 0
Belief revision operator B, which yields the postbelief
from an experiment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉, compactly repre-
sents all of the formulas above:
B(E) , (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|o))  H
where o ∈ Γ(δ′)  L
δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
Because it uses Γ, operator B produces values by sam-
pling, so we write b′H ∈ B(E). To select a particular b′H
from B, we provide observation o:
B(E , o) , (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|o))  H
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p bH b
′
H1 b
′
H2
A 0.98 1 0
B 0.01 0 0.5
C 0.01 0 0.5
Table 1. Beliefs about p
p g a δ′A δ
′
A|o1 δ
′
A|o2
A A 0 0 0 0
A A 1 0.98 1 0
B A 0 0.01 0 0.5
B A 1 0 0 0
C A 0 0.01 0 0.5
C A 1 0 0 0
. . . 0 0 0
Table 2. Distributions on the output
3.2. Password Checking as an Experiment
Attaching confidentiality labels to the password checker
of Section 1 yields:
PWC : if pH = gL then aL := 1 else aL := 0
Repeating the analysis of PWC in terms of our experiment
model allows the informal reasoning previously used to be
made precise.
The attacker starts by choosing prebelief bH , perhaps
as formalized in Table 1. The columns of this table give
the probability that the belief at the head of the column
assigns to the state at the beginning of a row. Next, the
system chooses the initial high projection σH , and the at-
tacker chooses the initial low projection σL. In the first ex-
periment in Section 1, the password was A, so the system
chooses σH = (p 7→ A). Similarly, the attacker chooses
σL = (g 7→ A, a 7→ 0). (The initial value of a is actually ir-
relevant, since it is never used by the program and a is set
along all control paths.) Next, the system runs PWC . The
output distribution δ′ should clearly be a point mass at the
state σ′ = (p 7→ A, g 7→ A, a 7→ 1); the semantics in Sec-
tion 5 will validate this intuition. Since σ′ is the only state
that can be sampled from δ′, the attacker’s observation o1 is
σ′  L = (g 7→ A, a 7→ 1).
In the final step of the protocol, the attacker applies the
definition of B. He runs a thought experiment, predicting an
output distribution δ′A = [[PWC ]](σ˙L ⊗ bH), given in Ta-
ble 2. The ellipsis in the final row of the table indicates that
all states not shown have frequency 0. This distribution is
intuitively correct: the attacker believes that he has a 98%
chance of being authenticated, whereas 1% of the time he
will fail to be authenticated because the password is B, and
another 1% because it is C. The attacker conditions pre-
diction δ′A on observation o1, obtaining δ′A|o1, also shown
in Table 2. Projecting to high yields the attacker’s postbe-
lief b′H1, shown in Table 1. This postbelief is what the infor-
mal reasoning in Section 1 suggested: the attacker is certain
that the password is A.
The second experiment in Section 1 is also correctly
modeled by a formal experiment. In it, bH and σL remain
the same as before, but σH becomes (p 7→ C). Observation
o2 is therefore the point mass at (g 7→ A, a 7→ 0). The pre-
diction δ′A remains unchanged, and conditioned on o2 it be-
comes δ′A|o2, shown in Table 2. Projecting to high yields the
new postbelief b′H2 in Table 1. This postbelief again agrees
with the informal reasoning: the attacker believes that there
is a 50% chance each for the password to be B or C.
3.3. Bayesian Belief Revision
Postbelief operator B is an application of Bayesian in-
ference, which is a standard technique in applied statistics
for making inferences when uncertainty is made explicit
through probability models [8]. The fundamental Bayesian
method of updating a hypothesis Hyp based on an observa-
tion obs is Bayes’ rule:
Pr(Hyp|obs) =
Pr(Hyp)Pr(obs|Hyp)
∑
Hyp′ Pr(Hyp
′)Pr(obs|Hyp′)
In our model, the attacker’s hypothesis is about the val-
ues of high states, so the domain of hypotheses is State  H .
Therefore Pr(Hyp), the probability he ascribes to a particu-
lar hypothesis σH , is modeled by bH(σH). The probability
Pr(obs|Hyp) the attacker ascribes to an observation given
the assumed truth of a hypothesis is modeled by the pro-
gram semantics: the probability of an observation o given
an assumed high input σH is ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)  L)(o).
Given experiment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉, instantiating Bayes
rule on these probability models yields B(E , o), which is
Pr(σH |o):
B(E , o) =
bH(σH) · ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)  L)(o)∑
σ′
H
bH(σ
′
H) · ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙
′
H)  L)(o)
With this instantiation, we can show that how an attacker
updates his belief according to our experiment protocol is
equivalent to Bayesian updating.
Theorem 1
B(E , o)(σH) = B(E , o)
Proof. In Appendix A. 
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3.4. Mutable High State and Nontermination
Section 3.1 made two simplifying assumptions about
program S: it never modifies high input, and it always ter-
minates. We now dispense with these mostly minor techni-
cal issues.
To eliminate the first assumption, note that if S were to
modify the high state, the attacker’s prediction δ′A would
correlate high outputs with low outputs. However, to calcu-
late a postbelief, δ′A must correlate high inputs with low out-
puts. So the high input state must be preserved in δ′A. Let the
notation b0H mean the same distribution as bH , except that
each state of its domain has a 0 as a superscript. So, if bH
ascribes probability p to the state σ, then b0H ascribes prob-
ability p to the state σ0. We assume that S cannot modify
states with a superscript 0. In the case that states map vari-
ables to values, this could be achieved by defining σ0 to be
the same state as σ, but with the superscript 0 attached to
variables; for example, if σ(v) = 1 then σ0(v0) = 1. Note
that S cannot modify σ0 if did not originally contain any
variables with superscripts.
Using this notation, the belief revision operator is ex-
tended to B!, which allows S to modify the high state in ex-
periment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉.
B!(E) , (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH ⊗ b0H)|o))  H
0
where o ∈ Γ(δ′)  L
δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
In the first line of the definition, the high input state is
preserved by introducing the product with b0H , and the at-
tacker’s postbelief about the input is recovered by restrict-
ing to H0, the high input state with the superscript 0.
To eliminate the second assumption, note that program
S must terminate for an attacker to obtain a low state as an
observation when running S. There are two ways to model
the observation in the case of nontermination, depending on
whether the attacker can detect nontermination.
If the attacker has an oracle that decides nontermination,
then nontermination can be modeled in the standard deno-
tational style. Let⊥ be the divergent state representing non-
termination, State⊥ , State ∪ {⊥}, and ⊥  L , ⊥. Non-
termination is now allowed as an observation, leading to an
extended belief revision operator B!⊥:
B!⊥(E) , (out⊥(S, σ˙L ⊗ bH ⊗ b0H)|o)  H
0
where o ∈ Γ(δ′)  L
δ′ = out⊥(S, σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
Function out⊥(S, δ) produces a distribution that yields
the frequency that S terminates, or fails to terminate, on in-
put distribution δ:
out⊥(S, δ) , λσ : State⊥ . if σ = ⊥
then mass(δ)−mass([[S]]δ)
else ([[S]]δ)(σ)
If S does not terminate on some input states in δ, then out-
put distribution [[S]]δ will contain less mass than δ; other-
wise, mass(δ) will equal mass([[S]]δ). Missing mass corre-
sponds to nontermination [20, 17], so out⊥ maps the miss-
ing mass to ⊥.
An attacker that cannot correctly detect nontermination
is more difficult to model. At some point during the execu-
tion of the program, he will stop waiting for the program to
terminate and declare that he has observed nontermination.
However, he may be incorrect in doing so—leading to be-
liefs about nontermination and instruction timings. The in-
teraction of these beliefs with beliefs about high inputs is
complex; we leave this for future work.
4. Measuring Information Flow
The informal analysis ofPWC in Section 1 suggests that
information flow corresponds to an improvement in the ac-
curacy of an attacker’s belief. Recall the more accurate be-
lief b is with respect to high state σ˙H , the less the distance
D(b _ σ˙H). We use change in accuracy, as measured by
distance, to quantify information flow.
4.1. Information Flow from a Report
Given an experiment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉, a report is a
pair 〈E , b′H〉 such that b′H ∈ B(E). The accuracy of the at-
tacker’s prebelief bH in a report 〈E , b′H〉 is D(bH _ σ˙H);
the accuracy of the attacker’s postbelief b′H in that report
is D(b′H _ σ˙H). And, the amount of information flow Q
caused by 〈E , b′H〉 is defined as the difference of these two
quantities:
Q(〈E , b′H〉) , D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
H _ σ˙H)
Thus the amount of information flow (in bits) in Q corre-
sponds to the improvement in the accuracy of the attacker’s
belief, exactly as desired.
Using relative entropy as the distance operator D in the
definition of Q allows us to give a concrete interpretation to
the number produced by our definition of Q. Recalling the
coding efficiency interpretation of relative entropy in Sec-
tion 2.4, the amount of information flow Q is the improve-
ment in the expected inefficiency of the attacker’s optimal
code for the high input.
With an additional definition from information theory, a
more consequential characterization of Q is possible. Let
Iδ(F ) denote the information contained in event F drawn
from probability distribution δ:
Iδ(F ) , − lg Prδ(F )
Information is sometimes called “surprise” because I mea-
sures how surprising an event is; for example, events that
occur with probability 1 have surprise 0.
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For an attacker, there are two unknowns in the outcome
of an experiment: the initial high state, and the probabilistic
choices made by the program. Let δS = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)  L
be the system’s distribution on low outputs, and δA =
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)  L be the attacker’s distribution on low
outputs. IδA(o) measures the information contained in o
about both unknowns, but IδS (o) measures only the latter
unknown. For programs that make no probabilistic choices,
neither quantity can measure any information about prob-
abilistic choices; thus, δA contains information about only
the initial high state, and δS is a point mass at some state σ
such that σ  L = o, so the amount of information IδS (o) is
0. For probabilistic programs, IδS (o) is generally not equal
to 0; subtracting it removes all the information contained
in IδA(o) that is solely about the outcomes of probabilis-
tic choices, leaving only information about high inputs.
The following theorem states that Q measures the infor-
mation about high input σH contained in observation o.
Theorem 2
Q(〈E , b′H〉) = IδA(o)− IδS (o)
Proof. In Appendix A. 
As an example, consider the experiments on PWC in
Section 3.2. The first experiment E1 has the attacker cor-
rectly guess the password A, so:
E1 = 〈PWC , bH , (p 7→ A), (g 7→ A, a 7→ 0)〉
where bH (and the other beliefs about to be used) is de-
fined in Table 1. Only one report, 〈E1, b′H1〉, is possible from
this experiment. Calculating Q(〈E1, b′H1〉) yields a flow of
0.0291 bits from the report. The small flow makes sense be-
cause the report has only confirmed something the attacker
already believed to be almost certainly true. In experiment
E2 the attacker guesses incorrectly.
E2 = 〈PWC , bH , (p 7→ C), (g 7→ A, a 7→ 0)〉
Again, only one report 〈E2, b′H2〉 is possible from this ex-
periment, and calculating Q(〈E2, b′H2〉) yields an informa-
tion flow of 5.6439 bits. A higher information flow makes
sense because the attacker’s postbelief is much closer to cor-
rectly identifying the high state. The attacker’s prebelief bH
ascribed a 0.02 probability to the event [p 6= A], and the in-
formation of an event with probability 0.02 is 5.6439, the
same information flow calculated above. This suggests that
Q is correctly measuring the information about high input
contained in the observation.
4.2. Comparing Accuracy and Uncertainty
The information flow in experiment E2 is surprisingly
high; at most two bits are required to store password p
bH = 〈0.5, 0.5〉
o = (l 7→ 1)
bH = 〈0.5, 0.5〉
o = (l 7→ 0)
bH = 〈0.99, 0.01〉
o = (l 7→ 1)
bH = 〈0.01, 0.99〉
o = (l 7→ 0)
-ﬀ
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Figure 2. Effect of FLIP on postbelief
in memory, so how can the program leak more than five
bits? In brief, the extra bits correct the attacker’s misconcep-
tions about the password, but this question also illuminates
the difference between measuring information flow based
on uncertainty versus based on accuracy. Consider how an
uncertainty-based approach would analyze the program.
The attacker’s initial uncertainty about p is H(bH) =
0.1614 bits, where H is the information-theoretic measure
of entropy, or uncertainty, in a probability distribution δ.
H(δ) , −
∑
σ δ(σ) · lg δ(σ)
Maximum entropy is achieved by uniform distributions
[13], so the maximal uncertainty about p is lg 3 ≈ 1.6 bits,
the same number of bits required to store p. In the sec-
ond experiment, the attacker’s final uncertainty about p is
H(bH2) = 1. The reduction in uncertainty is 0.1614− 1 =
−0.8386. An uncertainty-based analysis, such as [5] or [16],
would interpret this negative quantity as an absence of infor-
mation flow. But this is clearly not the case—the attacker’s
belief has been guided much closer to reality by the ex-
periment. The uncertainty-based analysis ignores reality by
measuring bH and bH2 against themselves only, instead of
against the high state σH .
Accuracy and uncertainty are orthogonal properties of
beliefs, as shown in Figure 2. The figure shows the change
in an attacker’s accuracy and uncertainty when an experi-
ment E = 〈FLIP , bH , (h 7→ 0), (l 7→ 0)〉 is run, and obser-
vation o is generated by the run. The notation bH = 〈x, y〉
means that bH(h 7→ 0) = x and bH(h 7→ 1) = y. The pro-
gram FLIP is:
FLIP : l := h 0.998 l := ¬h
Usually, FLIP sets l to be h, so the attacker will expect
this to be the case. Runs that satisfy this expectation will
cause his postbelief to be more accurate, but may cause his
uncertainty to either increase or decrease, depending on his
7
Quadrant h I II III IV
bH : 0 0.5 0.5 0.99 0.01
1 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.99
o (l 7→ 0) (l 7→ 1) (l 7→ 1) (l 7→ 0)
b′H : 0 0.99 0.01 0.5 0.5
1 0.01 0.99 0.5 0.5
Increase in accuracy +0.9855 −5.6439 −0.9855 +5.6439
Reduction in uncertainty +0.9192 +0.9192 −0.9192 −0.9192
Table 3. Analysis of FLIP
p
bH : A 0.98
B 0.01
C 0.01
b′H : A 0
B 0.5
C 0.5
Increase in accuracy +5.6439
Reduction in uncertainty −0.8245
Table 4. Analysis of PWC
prebelief; when uncertainty increases, an uncertainty met-
ric would mistakenly say that no flow has occurred.
With probability 0.01, FLIP produces a run that fools
the attacker and sets l to be ¬h, causing his belief to be-
come less accurate. The decrease in accuracy results in mis-
information, which is a negative information flow. When the
attacker’s prebelief is almost completely accurate, such runs
will make him more uncertain. But when the attacker’s pre-
belief is uniform, runs that result in misinformation will
make him less uncertain; when uncertainty decreases, an
uncertainty metric would mistakenly say that flow has oc-
curred. Table 3 demonstrates this phenomenon concretely.
The quadrant labels refer to Figure 2. For each quadrant,
the attacker’s prebelief bH , observation o, and the result-
ing postbelief b′H is given in the top half of the table. In
the bottom half, increase in accuracy is calculated using
the information flow metric Q(〈E , b′H〉), and reduction in
uncertainty is calculated using the difference in entropy
H(bH)−H(b
′
H).
Finally, recall that when the attacker guessed a password
incorrectly in Section 1, his belief became more accurate
and more uncertain. Table 4 gives the exact changes in his
accuracy and uncertainty, using guess g = A and password
p = C.
In summary, uncertainty is inadequate as a metric for in-
formation flow. By Theorem 2, information flows when an
attacker’s belief becomes more accurate, but an uncertainty
metric can mistakenly measure a flow of zero or less. In-
versely, misinformation flows when an attacker’s belief be-
comes less accurate, but an uncertainty metric can mistak-
enly measure a positive information flow. Hence, accuracy
is the correct metric for information flow.
4.3. Expected Information Flow
We expect the results of this paper to be useful in decid-
ing whether a program satisfies a quantitative security prop-
erty. Since an experiment on a probabilistic program S can
produce many reports, it is reasonable to assume that such
properties will discuss expected flow over those reports. So
we define expected flow QE over all reports from experi-
ment E :
QE(E) , Eo∈δ′L[Q(〈E ,B(E , o)〉)]
=
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o)
·Q(〈E , ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|o)  H)〉)
where δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L⊗ σ˙H) gives the probability distribution
on reports, as in Figure 1, and Eδ[X] is the expected value
of an expression X with respect to distribution δ.
Expected flow is useful in analyzing probabilistic pro-
grams that can produce many observations for a single in-
put. Consider a faulty password checker:
FPWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0;
a := ¬a 0.18 skip
With probability 0.1, FPWC flips the authentication flag.
Can this program be expected to confound attackers; that is,
does FPWC leak less expected information than PWC ?
This question can be answered by comparing the expected
flow from FPWC to the flow of PWC . Table 5 gives the
flow ofFPWC for experiments EF1 and EF2 , which are iden-
tical to E1 and E2 from Section 4.1, except that they execute
FPWC instead ofPWC . Observe that, for both pairs of ex-
periments, the expected flow of FPWC is less than the flow
of PWC . The random flip of a makes it more difficult for
the attacker to increase the accuracy of his belief.
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E o Q(〈E ,B(E , o)〉) QE(E)
E1 (a 7→ 1) 0.0291 0.0291
(a 7→ 0) impossible
EF1 (a 7→ 1) 0.0258 0.0018
(a 7→ 0) −0.2142
E2 (a 7→ 1) impossible 5.6439
(a 7→ 0) 5.6439
EF2 (a 7→ 1) −3.1844 2.3421
(a 7→ 0) 2.9561
Table 5. Leakage of PWC and FPWC
Reports 〈EF1 , (a 7→ 0)〉 and 〈EF2 , (a 7→ 1)〉 correspond
to an execution where the value of a is flipped. The flow for
these reports is negative, indicating that the program is giv-
ing the attacker misinformation, as described in Section 4.2.
Calculating expected flow requires a summation over all
o ∈ StateL, which may be a countably infinite set; this is
infeasible to calculate either by hand or by machine. For-
tunately, expected flow can be conservatively approximated
by conditioning on a single distribution rather than condi-
tioning on many observations. Conditioning δ on δL has
the effect of making the low projection of δ identical to δL,
while leaving the high projection of δ unchanged.
δ|δL , λσ .
δ(σ)
∑
σ′ | σ≈Lσ′
δ(σ′)
· δL(σ  L)
The bound on expected flow is then calculated as follows.
Theorem 3 Let:
E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉
δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
eH = (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|(δ
′  L))  H
Then:
QE(E) ≤ Q(〈E , eH〉)
Proof. In Appendix A. 
The experiment model can be extended to increase the
applicability of expected flow. Rather than choose a partic-
ular low state σL, the attacker may more generally choose
a distribution over low states, δL, which the system sam-
ples to produce the initial low state σL ∈ Γ(δL). This ex-
presses a randomized guessing strategy for the attacker. By
taking the expectation in QE with respect to both σL and o,
the expected flow for the attacker’s guessing strategy can be
calculated. The initial high state σH can be similarly gener-
alized to δH and incorporated into QE . This could be used,
for example, to determine the expected flow of the pass-
word checker when users’ choice of passwords can be de-
scribed by a distribution.
Repetition # 1 2
bH : A 0.98 0
B 0.01 0.5
C 0.01 0.5
σL(g) A B
o(a) 0 0
b′H : A 0 0
B 0.5 0
C 0.5 1
Q(〈E , b′H〉) 5.6439 1.0
Table 6. Repeated experiments on PWC
4.4. Maximum Information Flow
Designers of quantitative security properties are likely to
want to limit maximum information flow. So we define the
maximum amount of information flow that program S can
cause in a single report as the maximum amount of flow
from any report of any experiment E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉 on
S:
Qmax(S) , maxE,b′
H
| b′
H
∈B(E) Q(〈E , b
′
H〉)
Consider applying Qmax(S) to PWC . Assuming that
bH satisfies the admissibility restriction in Section 2.4 and
that the attacker guesses an incorrect password yields that
PWC can leak at most − lg( · n−1
n
) bits per report, where
n is the number of possible passwords. If  = 1, the at-
tacker is forced to have a uniform distribution over pass-
words, representing a lack of belief for any particular value
for the password. Additionally, if n = 2k for some k, then
we obtain that for k-bit passwords, PWC can leak at most
k − lg(2k − 1) bits in a report; for k > 12 this is less than
0.0001 bits, supporting the intuition that password check-
ing leaks little information.
4.5. Repeated Experiments
Nothing precludes repetition of experiments. The most
interesting case has the attacker return to step 2b of the ex-
periment protocol in Figure 1 after updating his belief in
step 4; that is, the system keeps the high input to the pro-
gram constant, and the attacker is allowed to check new low
inputs based on the results of previous experiments. Sup-
pose that experiment E1 from Section 4.1 is run and then
repeated with σL = (g 7→ B). Then the attacker’s belief
about the password evolves as shown in Table 6.
Summing the information flow for each repetition yields
a total information flow of 6.6439. This total corresponds
to what Q would calculate for a single experiment, if that
experiment changed prebelief bH to postbelief b′H2, where
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b′H2 is the attacker’s postbelief in the second repetition in
Table 6:
D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
H2 _ σ˙H) = 6.6439− 0
= 6.6439
This example is an instance of a more general theo-
rem stating that the postbelief from a series of experiments,
where the postbelief from one experiment becomes the pre-
belief to the next, contains all the information learned dur-
ing the series. Let Ei = 〈S, bHi , σH , σLi〉 be the ith exper-
iment in the series, and let ri = 〈Ei, b′Hi〉 be a report from
Ei. Let r1, . . . , rn be a series of n reports in which prebe-
lief bHi in experiment Ei is the postbelief b′Hi−1 from re-
port i− 1. Finally, let b′H0 = bH1 be the attacker’s prebelief
for the entire series.
Theorem 4
D(bH1 _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
Hn
_ σ˙H) =
∑
i | 1≤i≤n Q(ri)
Proof. In Appendix A. 
5. Language Semantics
The last piece required for our framework is a semantics
[[S]] based on distributions. For our programming language,
we use while-programs extended with a probabilistic choice
construct p8. The operational semantics for the determinis-
tic subset of this language is standard. Probabilistic choice
S1 p8 S2 executes s1 with probability p or S2 with proba-
bility 1− p.
Metavariables S, v, E, and B range over programs, vari-
ables, arithmetic expressions, and Boolean expressions, re-
spectively. Evaluation of expressions is assumed side-effect
free, but we do not otherwise give their syntax or seman-
tics. The syntax of the language is:
S ::= skip | v := E | S;S | if B then S else S
| while B do S | S p8 S
The experiment protocol of Section 3 requires a seman-
tics in which programs are functions that map distributions
to distributions. Here we build such a semantics in two
stages, as suggested by Section 2.2. First, we build a sim-
pler semantics that maps states to distributions. Second, we
lift the simpler semantics so that it operates on distributions.
Our first task then is to define the semantics [[S]] :
State → Dist. This semantics should describe the proba-
bility of termination in a given state: if [[S]]σ = δ, then the
probability of S, when begun in σ, terminating in σ′ should
be δ(σ′). The semantics is given in Figure 3. We assume
some semantics [[E]] : State → Val that gives meaning to
expressions, and a semantics [[B]] : State → Bool that gives
meaning to Boolean expressions.
The statements skip, if, and while have essentially the
same denotations as in the standard deterministic case.4
State update σ[v 7→ V ], where V ∈ Val, changes the value
of v to V in σ. The distribution update δ[v 7→ E] in the de-
notation of assignment represents the result of substituting
the meaning of E for v in all the states of δ and is defined
as:
δ[v 7→ E] , λσ . (
∑
σ′ | σ′[v 7→[[E]]σ′]=σ δ(σ
′))
The sequential composition of two programs, written
S1;S2, is defined using intermediate states. The probabil-
ity of S1;S2, starting from σ, reaching a final state σ′′ is the
sum of the probabilities of all the ways that S1 can reach
some intermediate σ′ and then S2 from that σ′ can reach
σ′′. Note that ([[S1]]σ)(σ′) is the probability that S1, begin-
ning in σ, terminates in σ′, because [[S1]]σ produces a dis-
tribution that, when applied to σ′, returns the probability of
termination in σ′. Similarly, ([[S2]]σ′)(σ′′) is the probabil-
ity that S2, beginning in σ′, terminates in σ′′.
The final program construct is probabilistic choice, S1 p8
S2, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The semantics multiplies the prob-
ability of choosing a side Si with the probability that Si
produces a particular output state σ′. Since the same state
σ′ might actually be produced by both sides of the choice,
the probability of its occurrence is the sum of the probabil-
ity from either side: p · ([[S1]]σ)(σ′)+ (1−p) · ([[S2]]σ)(σ′).
This formula is simplified to the definition in Figure 3 us-
ing · and + as pointwise operators:
p · δ , λσ . p · δ(σ)
δ1 + δ2 , λσ . δ1(σ) + δ2(σ)
To show how to lift the semantics in Figure 3 and define
[[S]] : Dist → Dist we use an intuition to what is done for
the sequential operator above, where there are many states
σ′ in which S could begin execution, and all of them could
potentially terminate in state σ. So to compute ([[S]]δ)(σ),
we take a weighted average over all input states σ′. The
weights are δ(σ′), which describes how likely σ′ is to be
used as the input state. With σ′ as input, S terminates in
state σ with frequency ([[S]]σ′)(σ). Thus we define [[S]]δ as:
[[S]]δ , λσ .
∑
σ′ δ(σ
′) · ([[S]]σ′)(σ)
This is in accordance with the requirements of Section 2.2.
Applying this definition to the semantics in Figure 3
yields [[S]]δ for each kind of statement in the language
4 To ensure that the fixed point for while exists, we have to verify
that Dist is a complete partial order (CPO) with a bottom element.
In fact, to make this so, we have to extend the definition Dist to be
State → [0, 1]. This makes distributions correspond to subprobabil-
ity measures, and it is easy to check that the semantics always pro-
duces subprobability measures as output. The LUB is at most λσ . 1,
and the bottom element is λσ . 0.
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[[skip]]σ = σ˙
[[v := E]]σ = σ˙[v 7→ E]
[[S1;S2]]σ = λσ
′′ .
∑
σ′ ([[S1]]σ)(σ
′) · ([[S2]]σ
′)(σ′′)
[[if b then S1 else S2]]σ = if [[B]]σ then [[S1]]σ else [[S2]]σ
[[while B do S]]σ = fixf : Dist → Dist. if [[B]]σ then f([[S]]σ) else σ˙
[[S1 p8 S2]]σ = p · [[S1]]σ + (1− p) · [[S2]]σ
Figure 3. Semantics of programs in states
[[skip]]δ = δ
[[v := E]]δ = δ[v 7→ E]
[[S1;S2]]δ = [[S2]]([[S1]]δ)
[[if B then S1 else S2]]δ = [[S1]](δ |B) + [[S2]](δ | ¬B)
[[while B do S]]σ = fixf : Dist → Dist. f([[S]](δ |B)) + (δ | ¬B)
[[S1 p8 S2]]δ = [[S1]]p · δ + [[S2]](1− p) · δ
Figure 4. Semantics of programs in distributions
as shown in Figure 4. This corresponds directly to a se-
mantics given by Kozen [14], which interprets programs
as continuous linear operators on measures. Our semantics
uses an extension of the distribution conditioning operator
| to Boolean expressions. Whereas distribution condition-
ing produces a normalized distribution, Boolean expression
conditioning produces an unnormalized distribution:
δ|B , λσ . if [[B]]σ then δ(σ) else 0
By producing unnormalized distributions as part of the
meaning of if and while statements we are tracking the fre-
quency with which each branch of the statement is chosen.
6. Related Work
We believe our work is the first to address and show
the importance of attacker beliefs in quantifying informa-
tion flow. Perhaps the first connection between information
theory and information flow is Denning [5], who demon-
strates the analysis of a few particular assignment and if
statements, using entropy to calculate leakage. Millen [19],
using deterministic state machines, proves that a system sat-
isfies noninterference exactly when the mutual information
between certain inputs and outputs is zero. He also pro-
poses mutual information as a metric for information flow,
but does not show how to compute the amount of flow for
programs.
Wittbold and Johnson [25] introduce nondeducibility
on strategies, an extension of Sutherland’s nondeducibility
[21]. Wittbold and Johnson observe that if a program is run
multiple times and feedback between runs is allowed, then
information can be leaked by coding schemes across mul-
tiple runs. A system that is nondeducible on strategies has
no noiseless communication channels between high input
and low output, even in the presence of feedback. The flow
model (FM) is a security property first given by McLean
[18] and later given a quantitative formalization by Gray
[10], who called it the Applied Flow Model (AFM). The FM
stipulates that the probability of a low output may depend
on previous low outputs, but not on previous high outputs.
Gray formalizes this in the context of probabilistic state ma-
chines, and he relates noninterference to the rate of max-
imum flow between high and low. Browne [1] develops a
novel application of the idea behind the Turing test to char-
acterize information flow: a system passes Browne’s Tur-
ing test exactly when for all finite lengths of time, the infor-
mation flow over that time is zero. Halpern and O’Neill [11]
construct a framework for reasoning about secrecy that gen-
eralizes many previous results on qualitative and probabilis-
tic security.
Volpano [22] gives a type system that can be used to
establish the security of password checking and one-way
functions such as MD5 and SHA1. Noninterference does
not allow such functions to be typed, so this type system is
an improvement over previous systems. However, the type
system does not allow a general analysis of quantitative in-
formation flow. Volpano and Smith [23] give another type
system that enforces relative secrecy, which requires that
well-typed programs cannot leak confidential data in poly-
nomial time.
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Weber [24] defines the property n-limited secu-
rity, which allows declassification at a rate that depends,
in part, on the size n of a buffer shared by the high and
low projections of a state. Lowe [15] defines the infor-
mation flow quantity of a process with two users H and
L to be the number of behaviors of H that L can dis-
tinguish. When there are n such distinguishable behav-
iors, H can use them to transmit lg n bits to L. These both
measure the size of channels rather than accuracy of be-
lief.
Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [7] relax noninterfer-
ence to approximate noninterference, where “approximate”
is a quantified measure of the similarity of two processes in
a process algebra. Similarity is measured using the supre-
mum norm over the difference of the probability distribu-
tions the processes create on the store. They show how to in-
terpret this quantity as a probability on an attacker’s ability
to distinguish two processes from a finite number of tests,
in the sense of statistical hypothesis testing. Finally, the pa-
per explores how to build an abstract interpretation that al-
lows approximation of the confinement of a process. More
recent work [6] has generalized this to measuring approxi-
mate confinement in probabilistic transition systems.
Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [3] apply information the-
ory to the analysis of while-programs. They develop a sta-
tic analysis that provides bounds on the amount of informa-
tion that can be leaked by a program. The metric for infor-
mation leakage is based on conditional entropy; the analy-
sis consists of a dataflow analysis, which computes a use-
def graph, accompanied by a set of syntax-directed infer-
ence rules, which calculate leakage bounds. The analysis of
Boolean and arithmetic expressions is somewhat problem-
atic, requiring the introduction of specialized rules that ap-
ply only outside of loops. Also, the bounds on if-statements
are calculated conservatively: the analysis does not make
use of any facts that are known about the relative probabil-
ity of each branch being chosen. Our work solves both of
these problems by using a denotational semantics that cal-
culates precise probability distributions; however, we have
not developed a static analysis. In other work [2], the same
authors investigate other leakage metrics, settling on condi-
tional mutual information as an appropriate metric for mea-
suring flow in probabilistic languages; they do not consider
relative entropy. Mutual information is always at least 0, so
unlike relative entropy it cannot represent misinformation.
McIver and Morgan [16] calculate the channel capacity
of a program using conditional entropy. They add demonic
nondeterminism as well as probabilistic choice to the lan-
guage of while-programs, and they show that the perfect
security (0 bits of leakage) of a program is determined by
the behavior of its deterministic refinements. They also con-
sider restricting the power of the demon making the nonde-
terministic choices, such that it can see all data, or just low
data, or no data.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a model for incorporating attacker
belief into the analysis of quantitative information flow in
programs. The fundamental insight is that attackers’ distri-
butions on high state represent subjective beliefs, not ob-
jective facts. A theory based on beliefs reveals that uncer-
tainty, the traditional metric for information flow, is inad-
equate: it cannot satisfactorily explain even the simple ex-
ample of password checking. Accuracy is the appropriate
metric for information flow, and we have shown how to use
it to calculate exact, expected, and maximum flow. A for-
mal model of experiments we give enables precise descrip-
tions of attackers’ actions. We have instantiated the model
with a probabilistic semantics and have given several exam-
ples of applying the model and metric to the measurement
of information flow.
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A. Proofs
Theorem 1 Let E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉.
B(E , o)(σH) = B(E , o)
Proof.
B(E , o)
= 〈 Definition of B 〉
bH(σH) · ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)  L)(o)∑
σ′
H
bH(σ
′
H) · ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙
′
H)  L)(o)
= 〈 Definition of δ  L, apply distribution to o 〉
bH(σH) · (
∑
σ | σL=o ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)(σ))∑
σ′
H
bH(σ
′
H) · (
∑
σ | σL=o ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙
′
H)(σ))
= 〈 Lemma 1.1 〉
bH(σH) · (
∑
σ | σL=o ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)(σ))∑
σ′ | σ′L=o [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Distributivity, one-point rule 〉∑
σ | σL=o ∧ σH=σH
∑
σ′
H
bH(σH) · [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)(σ)
∑
σ′ | σ′L=o [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Lemma 1.1 〉∑
σ | σL=o ∧ σH=σH
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ)∑
σ′ | σ′L=o [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Distributivity 〉
∑
σ | σL=o ∧ σH=σH
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ)∑
σ′ | σ′L=o [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Definition of δ  L 〉
∑
σ | σH=σH
(([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|o)(σ)
= 〈 Definition of δ  H , applying distribution to σH 〉
((([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|o)  H)(σH)
= 〈 Definition of B(E , o) 〉
B(E , o)(σH)

Lemma 1.1 Let σ  L = o.
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ) =
∑
σH
bH(σH) · [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)(σ)
Proof.
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ)
= 〈 Definition of [[S]]δ 〉
∑
σ′ (σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′) · ([[S]]σ′)(σ)
= 〈 Definition of point mass 〉
∑
σ′ | σ′L=σL
bH(σ
′  H) · ([[S]]σ′)(σ)
= 〈 Let σ = 〈σL, σH〉, nesting, one-point rule 〉
∑
σH
bH(σH) · [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)(σ)

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Theorem 2 Let E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉.
Q(〈E , b′H〉) = IδA(o)− IδS (o)
Proof.
Q(〈E , b′H〉)
= 〈 Definition of Q 〉
D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
H _ σ˙H)
= 〈 Definitions of D and point mass 〉
− lg bH(σH) + lg b
′
H(σH)
= 〈 Lemma 2.1, properties of lg 〉
− lg PrδA(o) + lg PrδS (o)
= 〈 Definition of I 〉
IδA(o)− IδS (o)

Lemma 2.1
b′H(σH) = bH(σH) ·
δS(o)
δA(o)
Proof.
b′H(σH)
= 〈 Definition of B 〉
(([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|o)  H)(σH)
= 〈 Definition of δ  H 〉
∑
σ | σH=σH
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|o)(σ)
= 〈 Definition of δ|o 〉
∑
σ | σH=σH ∧ σL=o
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ)
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)  L)(o)
= 〈 One-point rule: σ = 〈o, σH〉 〉
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(〈o, σH〉)
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)  L)(o)
= 〈 Definition of δA 〉
1
δA(o)
· [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(〈o, σH〉)
= 〈 Definition of [[S]]δ 〉
1
δA(o)
·
∑
σ′ (σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′) · ([[S]]σ′)(o˙⊗ σ˙H)
= 〈 Definition of ⊗, point mass 〉
1
δA(o)
·
∑
σ′ | σ′L=σL
bH(σ
′  H)
·([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ (σ˙
′  H)))(o˙⊗ σ˙H)
= 〈 High input is immutable 〉
1
δA(o)
·
∑
σ′ | σ′L=σL ∧ σ′H=σH
bH(σ
′  H)
·([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ (σ˙
′  H)))(o˙⊗ σ˙H)
= 〈 One-point rule: σ′ = 〈σL, σH〉 〉
1
δA(o)
· bH(σH) · ([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙
′
H))(o˙⊗ σ˙H)
= 〈 High input is immutable, Definition of δ  L 〉
1
δA(o)
· bH(σH) · (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙
′
H))  L)(o)
= 〈 Definition of δS 〉
bH(σH) ·
δS(o)
δA(o)
Note that the immutability of high input can be dispensed
with using the technique of Section 3.4. 
Theorem 3 Let:
E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉
δ′ = [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ σ˙H)
eH = (([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|(δ
′  L))  H
Then:
QE(E) ≤ Q(〈E , eH〉)
Proof.
QE(E)
= 〈 Definition of QE 〉
Eo∈δ′L[Q(〈E ,B(E , o)〉)]
= 〈 Definition of Q, let b′H = B(E , o)〉) 〉
Eo∈δ′L[D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
H _ σ˙H)]
= 〈 Linearity of E 〉
D(bH _ σ˙H)− Eo∈δ′L[D(b
′
H _ σ˙H)]
≤ 〈 Jensen’s inequality and convexity of D, see [4] 〉
D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(Eo∈δ′L[b
′
H ]_ σ˙H)
= 〈 Lemma 3.1 〉
D(bH _ σ˙H)−D(eH _ σ˙H)
= 〈 Definition of Q 〉
Q(〈E , eH〉)

Lemma 3.1 Let E , δ′, eH be defined as in Theorem 3. Let
b′H = B(E , o) and assume the range of o is always δ′  L.
Then:
Eo[b
′
H ] = eH
Proof.
Eo[b
′
H ](σH)
= 〈 Definitions of E, b′H 〉
(
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o) · B(E , o)(σH)
= 〈 Definition of B(E , o) 〉
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o) · ((([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|o)  H)(σH)
= 〈 Definition of δ  H , applying distribution to σH 〉
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o)
·(
∑
σ′ | σ′H=σH
(([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))|o)(σ
′))
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= 〈 Definition of δ|o, applying distribution to σ′ 〉
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o)
·(
∑
σ′ | σ′H=σH ∧ σ′L=o
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))(σ
′)
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)  L)(o)
)
= 〈 One-point rule 〉
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o) ·
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))(〈o, σH〉)
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)  L)(o)
= 〈 Definition of δ  L, applied to o 〉
∑
o (δ
′  L)(o) ·
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))(〈o, σH〉)∑
σ′ | σ′L=o [[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Let σ = 〈o, σH〉, change of dummy: o := σ,
definition of ≈L 〉
∑
σ | σH=σH
(δ′  L)(o)
·
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH))(σ)∑
σ′ | σ′≈Lσ
[[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)(σ
′)
= 〈 Definition of δ|δL, applied to σ 〉
∑
σ | σH=σH
([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|(δ
′  L))(σ)
= 〈 Definition of δ  H , applied to σH 〉
(([[S]](σ˙L ⊗ bH)|(δ
′  L))  H)(σH)
= 〈 Definition of eH 〉
eH(σH)
Therefore Eo[b′H ] = eH by extensionality.

Theorem 4
D(bH0 _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
Hn
_ σ˙H) =
∑
i Q(ri)
Proof.
∑
i | 1≤i≤n Q(ri)
= 〈 Definition of Q 〉
∑
i | 1≤i≤n D(bHi _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
Hi
_ σ˙H)
= 〈 Lemma 4.1, f(i) = D(bHi _ σ˙H),
f ′(i) = D(b′Hi _ σ˙H), bHi = b
′
Hi−1
,
b′H0 = bH1 〉
D(bH1 _ σ˙H)−D(b
′
Hn
_ σ˙H)

Lemma 4.1 Assume for a pair of functions f and f ′ that
∀i | 1≤i≤n f(i) = f
′(i − 1), n ≥ 2, and f(1) = f ′(0).
Then:
(
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f(i)− f
′(i)) = f(1)− f ′(n)
Proof.
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f(i)− f
′(i)
= 〈 f(i) = f ′(i− 1) 〉
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f
′(i− 1)− f ′(i)
= 〈 Distributivity 〉
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f
′(i− 1)
−
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f
′(i)
= 〈 Change of dummy: i := i− 1 〉
∑
i | 0≤i≤n−1 f
′(i)
−
∑
i | 1≤i≤n f
′(i)
= 〈 Split off term, n ≥ 2 〉
f ′(0) + (
∑
i | 1≤i≤n−1 f
′(i))
−(
∑
i | 1≤i≤n−1 f
′(i))− f ′(n)
= 〈 Arithmetic 〉
f ′(0)− f ′(n)
= 〈 f(1) = f ′(0) 〉
f(1)− f ′(n)

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